风险投资中的代理问题及风险分担与制度安排

Agency Problem,Brisk Sharing and Institution Arrangement in Venture Capital

信息不对称使得风险投资面临严重的代理问题,委托人需要通过对代理人进行适当的激励,以期通过承担风险约束代理人越轨活动的监督费用,来限制可能发生的利益偏差,恰当的制度安排能够降低代理成本和风险。在任何满足代理人参与约束及激励相容约束、委托人的预期效用最大化的激励机制契约中,代理人都必须承受部分风险。风险投资机制将监督、激励与风险分担有机地结合在一起,从而缓解风险投资中的代理问题。

Asymmetric makes the Venture Capital to face the serious agency problem.The principal through appropriately incentive to limit the possible benefit deviation,and undertake the direct expenses which control agent's beyond bound activity.Appropriate system arrangement can lower the agency cost and risk.Contract with participation constraint and incentive compatibility constraint could make principal achieve his objective,agent should share the risk.It concludes that appropriate incentives ,strong cons taints and risk,sharing are combined in venture capital investment,which greatly mitigate the agency problem and alleviates agency cost,risk.