摘要
国有企业经营者激励是我国国企改革的核心问题之一。国企经营者偏好企业控制权的强烈动机体现了国企经营者激励模式中的行政取向,也是当前国有企业中存在的激励悖论的主要原因。应完善国企经营者激励机制以缓解国企中的代理问题进而提高企业的经营效率。
<Abstrcat>It is one of the core problems to establish incentive mechanism of executive during our reform among the state-owned enterprises. The executives' strong motive for the right of control expresses the administrative target in the incentive mode, and also is the main reason of the incentive contradiction in the state-owned enterprises. The executive incentive mechanism should be improved to alleviate the agency problems and increase the operating efficiency in the state-owned enterprises.
出处
《南华大学学报(社会科学版)》
2005年第2期39-41,共3页
Journal of University of South China(Social Science Edition)
关键词
国有企业
经营者激励
state-owned enterprise
executive incentive mechanism