2Grossman, S. & Hart, O. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. [ J ].Political Economy, 1986, Vol. 94:691 -719.
3Cheung, Steven. The Contractual Nature of the Firm[J]. Jounal of Law and Economices, 1983, 26:1 -21.
4Grossman,Sanford and Oliver Hart.The Costs and Benefits of Ownership:A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration[J].Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
5Hart Oliver,John Moore.Incomplete contracts and renegotiation[J].Econometrica,1988,56(4):755-785.
6Jensen,M.C.and W.H.Meckling.Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior,Agency Costs and Ownership Structure[ J].Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360.
7Rajan,R.and Zingales,L.Power in a Theory of the Firm[J].Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,113(2):387-432.
8科斯,孙经纬译.企业的性质[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2000.
9Alchian Armen, Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization[ J]. American Economic Review, 1972, 62 (5): 777-795.
10Grossman, Sanford and Oliver Hart. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4) : 691-719.