经理人控制对高级管理人员报酬制定影响的实证研究被引量：12

Impacts of Executive Control on Senior Managers′ Compensation: Empirical Study of Listed Companies Offering Annual Salary Scheme

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摘要以近两年一直实行年薪制的155家上市公司2002年～2003年数据为样本,对经理权利论在金额最高的前三名高管人员现金报酬制定过程中的适用性进行了检验。研究发现,高级管理人员年薪并不受经理控制力的影响,不同股权结构上市公司在制定年薪时并没有明显不同;上一年的年薪总额对于确定高管人员当年的年薪起着至关重要的作用,在决定年薪增减时,公司主要以净资产收益率的变动为参考标准,独立董事对年薪的不合理变动能起到遏制作用。 A test is conducted on the applicability of executive control approach in drafting senior managers′ compensation scheme, taking the data of 155 listed companies from 2002 to 2003 as samples. It is found that executive control has no effect on senior managers′ annual salary. Neither does ownership structure. Instead, the previons year′s salary is in effect, when deciding to increase or decrease annual salary, change in the return on equity(ROE) is often regarded as the main criterion. Independent directors can keep annual salary′s irrational change within limits.

作者杨贺柯大钢马春爱

机构地区西安交通大学管理学院

出处《管理科学》 CSSCI 2005年第3期28-32,共5页 Journal of Management Science

关键词高级管理人员年薪经理人控制净资产收益率独立董事度 Senior managers′annual salary Executive control Return on equity Degree of independent director

分类号 F27 [经济管理—企业管理]

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