摘要
以近两年一直实行年薪制的155家上市公司2002年~2003年数据为样本,对经理权利论在金额最高的前三名高管人员现金报酬制定过程中的适用性进行了检验。研究发现,高级管理人员年薪并不受经理控制力的影响,不同股权结构上市公司在制定年薪时并没有明显不同;上一年的年薪总额对于确定高管人员当年的年薪起着至关重要的作用,在决定年薪增减时,公司主要以净资产收益率的变动为参考标准,独立董事对年薪的不合理变动能起到遏制作用。
A test is conducted on the applicability of executive control approach in drafting senior managers′ compensation scheme, taking the data of 155 listed companies from 2002 to 2003 as samples. It is found that executive control has no effect on senior managers′ annual salary. Neither does ownership structure. Instead, the previons year′s salary is in effect, when deciding to increase or decrease annual salary, change in the return on equity(ROE) is often regarded as the main criterion. Independent directors can keep annual salary′s irrational change within limits.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2005年第3期28-32,共5页
Journal of Management Science
关键词
高级管理人员年薪
经理人控制
净资产收益率
独立董事度
Senior managers′annual salary
Executive control
Return on equity
Degree of independent director