科研组织的委托—代理分析:现状及其问题

The Principal-Agent Analysis of Scientific Research Organization:The Present Conditions and Relative Issues

本文研究了科研组织中的委托—代理问题。将科研组织中委托—代理关系的本质归结为一个复杂的委托—代理链。分析了科研人员的预期净收益与实际净收益之间的偏差,以及委托—代理链上各级科研人员的收益差异等问题。在此基础上建立起了一个简单的委托—代理模型。

This paper deliberates the principal-agent issues in scientific research organization.We regard this principal-agent relationship as a complicated principal-agent chain.Then analyzes the bias between expected net revenue and real net revenue of scientists,and the different revenue of scientists in the principal-agent chain.On the basis of it,we established a simple principal-agent model.