摘要
通过建立模型,分析各参与主体在不同情况下的成本收益,提出关于刺激强度的新概念及其与违约的高度正相关性,找出产生违约的原因,建议通过合理的制度安排,降低刺激程度即降低违约率。
Through establishing the models, this paper analyzes on the cost benefits of all main participating parts under different conditions, puts forward the new conception of the stimulation strength and its high positive correlation with the default, finds out the causes of the default, and points out that should through rational arrangement of the systems to reduce the stimulation strength (default ratio).
出处
《科技情报开发与经济》
2005年第10期84-86,共3页
Sci-Tech Information Development & Economy
关键词
证券投资基金
基金治理
违约风险
刺激强度
funds from investment on security
funds management
default risk
stimulation strength