摘要
通过对各国政策性金融监督机制与特殊权力结构的比较,认为对政策性金融的监督是国家以政策性金融专门立法的形式,由政府直接控制政策性金融机构的主要人事任免权,政府相关部门参与协调与制约,国家审计机构定期或不定期的专门审计监督,以及由政府相关部门和权威专家或其他行业人员代表国家和公众的利益组合而成的董事会(理事会)的组织形式,对政策性金融机构具体行使最高的决策、监督、协调职能,从而构成了政策性金融独特的监督机制和权力结构。同时分析了中国在政策性金融监督问题上的一些误解及其原因与后果。
The typical way of supervisions of policy -based financial institutions is characterized by the following th rough the comparisons of supervision and r egulation mechanisms as well as priv ilege structures of them among some c ountries.1).It relies particularly on legislating for every sort of them.2).Major management is appointed dire ctly by government.3).Other governmental relevant departments are involved in reconciling and restricting them.4).National auditor regularly or irre gularly audits them.5).Board of director consists of perso ns from government relevant departm ents,authority and persons from oth er sectors,who represent the national and public interests to perform decision -making for,monitoring and reconciling those in-stitutions.All of those construct t he unique supervising mechanisms an d power structures of the policy -based financial insti-tutions together.Simultaneously,some misunderstandings and their re asons and results are analyzed in terms of the supervi-sions of China’s policy -based financial institutions.
出处
《国际金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第5期35-39,共5页
Studies of International Finance