国际贸易争端策略选择的进化博弈分析被引量：6

Analysis on Evolutionary Game of Strategic Choice of International Trade Conflict

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摘要本文以进化稳定策略为核心的进化博弈论作为理论基础,以模拟者动态方程作为分析工具,在经济主体(贸易争端中的国家)有限理性的前提下,研究长期条件下群体中(各个贸易参与国)选择不同策略的群体比例动态趋势和进化稳定性,分析了单群体成员间(WTO机制内)两国贸易争端对称动态博弈和两个群体成员间(WTO机制外)两国贸易争端非对称动态博弈。最后得出结论: 贸易弱国倾向于在WTO机制内通过多边贸易谈判解决争端,贸易强国则倾向于WTO机制外举行双边贸易谈判解决两国间的贸易争端。

作者唐凌李春杰

机构地区河南财经学院企业发展研究所华北电力大学工商管理学院

出处《世界经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第5期42-47,62,共7页 World Economy Studies

关键词贸易争端进化博弈进化稳定策略模拟者动态

分类号 F746 [经济管理—国际贸易]

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参考文献15

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