目标与激励:下岗失业人员小额担保贷款个案研究

本文以我国老工业基地——黑龙江齐齐哈尔的下岗职工小额担保贷款作个案研究。下岗失业人员小额担保贷款是一项主要以社会稳定为主要目标的信贷业务,在操作上面临着三重激励问题:一是由于商业银行的盈利性目标与社会目标的不完全相容,导致对开办该项业务的金融机构存在正向激励不足的问题;二是由于经过一段时间的劳动力市场优胜劣汰,当前很大部分下岗失业人员在很大程度上不具备真正的信贷偿还能力,因而出现了无力偿还贷款等无效激励问题;三是由于中央银行和商业性金融机构的介入,地方政府具有把当地社会稳定责任转嫁金融机构的负向激励问题。面对三重激励问题,本文认为明确责任,分担风险,建立面向各方当事人的激励机制是做好小额担保贷款的基本制度保证。

This paper studies the case of micro-lending for laid-off w orkers in Q iqihaer City,Heilongjiang Province. As a banking business with significant soci al equality target,micro-lending meets triple incentive distortions: less incen tive of commercial banks to expand such business,less incentive of laid-off wor kers for payment,and less incentive of local government to share the risk. Thus,this paper shows that it is necessary to induce adequate incentive and reasona ble risk sharing regime.