企业资本预算中的风险补偿与资本配置效率研究

The Research on Risk premium and Capital Allocative Efficiency in Capital Budgeting within Firms

在分权化企业的资本预算中,由于存在着分部管理者的道德风险与风险规避偏好,总部管理者必须对包含风险补偿的激励成本与激励努力带来的预期收益两者进行权衡。当努力导致的收益介于最优激励成本与风险规避偏好导致的次优激励成本之间时,风险补偿的存在将会导致总部管理者降低激励努力水平,从而减少了投资的期望收益,降低了资本的配置效率。

In capital budgeting within decentralized firms, due to the moral hazard and risk aversion preference of division managers, the headquarters has to trade off the incentive cost including the risk premium and the expected revenue produced by induced effort. When the revenue is between the optimal incentive cost and se-(cond) optimal incentive cost induced by the risk aversion preference, the existence of risk premium will decrease the level of effort, and reduce the expected revenue, therefore weaken the capital allocative efficiency.