摘要
文章提出了电力市场中企业合谋的问题;建立了合谋问题的一般模型,根据模型分析了促成和制约合谋发生和稳定的两类因素;特别指出了一些电力市场专门交易制度如价格帽制度,交易价格信息公开和中长期合同交易等对合谋的影响;根据这些原因推断,电力市场存在企业合谋的可能性,而且发电侧市场合谋发生的可能性大于零售市场。
This paper raises the question of collusions among bidders in the power market, and establishes a corresponding mathematical model. The influences of two types of factors which are respectively pro and against the collusions among bidders are carefully analyzed with especial examination of those institutions of transaction such price cap, transparent transaction price and long term & middle term contracts. Due to the reasons, there are the collusions among bidders in the power market, and much more possibility in the generation side market than in retail market.
出处
《长沙理工大学学报(社会科学版)》
2005年第1期47-50,共4页
Journal of Changsha University of Science and Technology:Social Science
基金
国家社会科学基金项目"我国电力工业规制与竞争改革的战略与政策研究"(项目编号:02BJY007)研究成果。