加强装备研制经费管理的经济学思考

Economics Analysis on Strengthening the Management of Weapons′ R&D Funds

为探讨如何进一步加强武器装备研制经费的使用管理,提高经费使用效率,以代理理论和资产专用性理论对武器装备研制经费管理中存在的突出问题进行分析.通过分析表明,这些问题主要源于委托-代理关系中所固有的道德风险与逆向选择;而武器装备所具有的高度的资产专用性,又颠覆了买卖双方的谈判优势地位,进一步强化了该领域的机会主义行为.在装备研制阶段引入适度竞争,则可有效缓解这些问题,进而提高装备研制经费的使用效率.

To discuss the approaches to strengthen the management of weapons′ R&D funds, the paper analysis the main problems in the management of weapons′ R&D(research and development) funds with agency theory and assert-specificity theory. Through analysis, it is proved that those problems stemmed from moral hazard and adverse selection in the principal-agent relationship. And the highly assert specificity quality of weapons changes the position of buyers and sellers in negotiations, which leads to strengthen the opportunist behaviors. Bringing suitable design competitions into R&D is beneficial to the alleviation of those problems.