我国管理层收购的利益驱动及政策建议

A Study of the Interest-Driven Power of the MBO and the Related Public Policies in China

我国上市公司特殊的股权结构和高层管理人员由政府任命委派的模式,决定了企业管理层和政府均存在推进管理层收购的利益驱动力。管理层收购在调整国有资本配置、完善上市公司股权结构、促使企业提高效率等方面具有积极意义,但也存在着增加公司治理难度、定价缺乏公允、融资渠道受到管制等问题。因此,完善管理层收购监管体系、建立竞价机制、调整融资政策,以及增强中介机构的诚信和独立性,以规范管理层收购行为,是当前政策与制度设计中要考虑的问题。

Owing to the facts of the special equity structure of listed companies in China and their government-appointed custodians, there exists interest-driven power in both the management and government. Chinese MBO has a positive function in adjusting state-owned assets allocation, improving the equity structure of listed companies and increasing productive efficiency of the enterprises. But it is also faced with problems, such as difficulty in management, unfairness of pricing mechanism and limitation of financing channel. Therefore, improving the supervising system of MBO, forming competing mechanism, adjusting MBO financing policy and enhancing sincerity and independence of the intermediate to regulate MBO activities are the important issues in considering the public policy and system designs at present.