基于委托-代理模型BOT模式的有效性分析

Effectiveness analysis based on principal-agent model for BOT scheme

研究了BOT模式的效率问题,分析了政府和项目公司之间的委托代理关系,建立了政府和项目公司之间的博弈模型,讨论了在信息对称和信息不对称情形下政府和项目公司的最优战略.通过对BOT模式和承建制的比较分析表明,对于技术水平高、不确定因素多和难以控制的建设项目,采用承建制会导致项目公司的“道德风险”,而采用BOT模式是有效的,它解决了在信息不对称情形下委托代理关系的“道德风险”问题,从而从机理上论证了BOT模式的有效性.

The effectiveness of BOT (build-operate-transfer) scheme is discussed. The principal-agent relationship between the government and the project company is analyzed. The principal-agent game model between them is formulated as well. The dominant strategies for the government and the project company are discussed under both symmetric information and asymmetric information conditions. By comparing BOT scheme with contract-for-work scheme for complicated infrastructure projects, it is shown that the latter will lead to the moral hazard from the project company, and the former is more effective to reduce the moral hazard under the case of asymmetric information. Therefore the mechanism effectiveness of BOT scheme is proved.