股权“市场结构”、最优负债和非效率投资行为

“Market Structure” of Ownership and Optimal Debt and Inefficient Investment Behavior

股权代理成本包括股东和经理之间的代理成本以及大股东对小股东的利益侵害。反映在企业投资决策上,经理为最大化私人利益存在投资不足和过度投资行为,大股东通过关联方投资的“掘隧道”行为侵占小股东利益。文章在一个统一的框架中分析了不同股权“市场结构”下股权集中程度、监督成本与两类非效率投资行为的关系,认为在完全竞争股权结构和完全垄断股权结构中,只要当第一大股东的持股比例达到一定水平后,监督才有效率而且监督成本与股权集中程度成反比关系,达到一定股权集中度的分散性股权结构和垄断性股权结构对于降低非效率投资行为的整体代理成本最为有效。文章认为应该适度分散国有股权,鼓励具有有效监督动机的股权适度集中以降低整体代理成本,股东引入最佳负债水平同样也能降低经理的代理成本。

The agency cost of share ownership includes the inefficient investment behavior of manager in order to maximize the private benefit but not the firm value and the tunneling behavior of the control shareholders at the expense of the small shareholder. The paper analyzes the debt level and the monitoring cost and two types of inefficient investment behavior under different ownership “market structure” in a common analysis frame. The paper argues that there exists adverse relationship between the ownership concentrate content and the monitoring efficiency. Finally, the paper holds that the stateowned ownership should be diversified properly to improve the monitoring efficiency, and the optimal debt should be introduced to mitigate the whole agency cost.