摘要
经典的Klein模型用新古典的厂商理论对完全垄断条件下的商业银行决策行为做了分析。其关于商业银行贷款决策独立于存款市场的结论(“两分离定理”)为管制当局解除存款利率限制提供了“恰当”的理由。但即使在风险中性的前提基础上,商业银行的贷款利率独立于存款利率还应该有更为严格的前提条件:商业银行提供存款产品和贷款产品的成本是可分离的。
Classical Klein model presents a neoclassical microeconomic analysis of the monopolistic commercial bank . The conclusion of model that the optimal loan rate is independent of the characteristics of the deposit market (the rule of 'Two Separable Decision') provides the 'proper' support for the authorities canceling the regulation of deposit rate. However, even if based on risk-neutrality, 'Two Separable Decision' of the commercial bank require another restrictive premise : the cost of deposit and loan is separable.
出处
《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
北大核心
2005年第3期68-70,共3页
Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
关键词
商业银行
两分离定理
完全垄断
存款利率
commercial bank
rule of 'two separable decision'
a ceiling
on deposit rates