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上市公司管理层薪酬激励的最优水平实证研究 被引量:1

Empirical Study on the Optimum Incentive Compensation of Top Management in Listed Companies
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摘要 为指导企业的薪酬委员会设计薪酬激励机制,为政府宏观调控居民收入、深化国企改革提供参考依据,需要客观、科学地检验我国企业薪酬激励与企业绩效的相关性,并探寻最优的薪酬数量水平.通过对企业三种薪酬激励方案分别进行相关性分析,得到了一些有意义的规律.研究结果表明,在现阶段,在实施利润分享制的企业,高管人员年收入为8~16万元最为合适;在实施年薪制的企业,高管人员的平均年薪为同期职工工资的10~20倍最为合适;在实施股权分享制的企业,高管人员的持股比例越高,公司绩效就越佳.在此基础上,从政策环境角度对完善我国企业的薪酬激励机制提出了一些合理化建议. In order to provide reference for compensation committees of companies to design compensational incentive mechanism, and to help government's macro adjustments and deepen reformation, it is necessary to examine the relationship between corporation performance and incentive compensation objectively and scientifically to find out the optimum level of compensation. Through empirical analyzing on three kinds of incentive methods, some laws are drawn. The findings show that in profit-sharing companies the appropriate annual income for the top management is eighty thousand to one hundred and sixty thousand Yuan at present. In annual-pay companies 10-20 times of average wages is appropriate. In ownership-sharing companies the more top management holds their companies' stock, the better their performance becomes. On these grounds some rational suggestions in terms of policy environment have been made.
机构地区 中南大学商学院
出处 《湘潭大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 北大核心 2005年第3期77-81,共5页 Journal of Xiangtan University:Philosophy And Social Sciences
基金 2004年度国家社会科学基金项目-企业微观效率基础的理论研究(04BJL031)
关键词 薪酬 最优水平 实证研究 相关性 compensation the optimum level empirical study relationship
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参考文献6

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