期刊文献+

构建我国社会信用机制的博弈分析 被引量:4

Game Analysis on Construting China's Social Credit Mechanism
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在没有内外制约的情况下,博奕方的失信行为能获得额外收益,博弈的结果无疑是失信。在有失信惩治和守信褒奖的良好社会信用环境下,守信策略是博弈方的理性选择。我国社会信用问题的最大症结就是守信激励与失信惩戒双重机制的缺失,其主要表现为:守信者的经济利益激励缺失,声誉、信誉、债权等得不到保护,失信者得不到道德谴责、经济惩罚和法律制裁。应采取培育信用文化、建立信用体系、征信系统和精神与物质奖励制度、建立失信惩罚制度、加快信用立法等策略来构建我国社会信用机制。 Under the Condition of absence of exterior and interior restraints, the failure to keep credit of the game party can get extra benefit and the result of game is failure to keep credit. While under the sound social credit environment of keeping-credit stimuli and breaking-credit punishment, keeping-credit strategy is the rational choice for game party. The biggest problem in China's social credit lies in the lack of the double mechanism of keeping-credit stimuli and breaking-credit punishment. Thus, we should endeavor to work on this.
作者 黄正新
出处 《广东商学院学报》 2005年第3期29-32,共4页 Journal of Guangdong University of Business Studies
关键词 信用 社会信用机制 守信激励 失信惩戒 博弈分析 credit social credit mechanism keeping-credit stimuli breaking-credit punishment game analysis
  • 相关文献

参考文献1

  • 1王艺.信用知识干部读本[Z].北京:中共中央党校出版社,2003.

同被引文献14

引证文献4

二级引证文献8

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部