摘要
给出了关于社会选择规则F强单调性及StrongStrategy-Proof的概念,讨论了社会选择规则什么情况下是完全独裁的.证明了如果备选对象至少有3个,则下面结论是相互等价的:(1)F是完全独裁的;(2)F是非常值的并且满足StrongStrategy-Proof;(3)F满足弱Pareto性质与强单调性质.
The Strong Monotony and the Strong Strategy-Proof for the social choice correspondences F are introduced. It is discussed that under what conditions the social choice correspondences is complete dictatorship, and it is shown that for any social choice correspondences F, whose range contains more than two alternatives, the following statements are equivalent: (1) F is complete dictatorship; (2) F is not constant and strong Strategy-Proof; (3) F is poor Pareto and Strong Monotonic.
出处
《华南师范大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2005年第2期121-124,共4页
Journal of South China Normal University(Natural Science Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70471018)
高等学校全国优秀博士学位论文作者专项资金资助项目(200267)