哲学家与在世——梅洛庞蒂对海德格尔的一个批判

Philosophers and Being-in-the-world: Merleau-Ponty's Criticism of Heidegger

本文依据梅洛庞蒂的思想提示,指出海德格尔对此在在世存在的描述是以哲学家本人的不在世为前提的。“在世”要以还原为前提。但海氏把还原定义为对存在者之存在的领会,还原的主体是此在,由此使他导向了对此在在世的生存论描述。但当海氏作这样的描述时,意味着作为哲学家的他本人已经预先处于存在之无蔽的立场上,已经是“非在世”的了。相反,梅洛庞蒂追随胡塞尔的道路,把还原定义为哲学家本人的一种认识态度的转变,但这种转变不可能是彻底的,因为哲学家“身体性”地处在世界上;对身体性的忽视正是导致海德格尔“非在世”的根本原因。

In the Merleau-Ponty's view, Heidegger's description of Being-in-the-w orld of Dasein was supposed that the philosopher himself was not being in the wo rld. The reasons are: 1) Heidegger's reduction was different from Husserl and M erleau-Ponty's; 2) Heidegger put himself in the light of Being. But both two r esulted from 3) Heidegger's neglect of the corporality. It should be displaye d being-in-the-world on the basis of phenomenological reduction. This was the directory of Merleau-Ponty's effort.