节点电价下输电容量限制与发电厂商市场力的仿真分析

Simulation of Transmission Capacities Limits and Suppliers’ Market Power with Node Price

通过构造节点电价下电力市场智能代理仿真模型,讨论了节点电价下输电容量限制与发电厂商市场力的相互影响关系.结果表明,在市场环境下,发电厂商的逐利行为会显著改变网络潮流,且输电网络的限制可放大发电厂商的市场力,网公司随着发电厂商市场力的实施而获利,故需要有严格的措施阻止其行为.进一步通过阻塞线路中的相关份额组成分割的市场,分析了输电网容量限制的影响,提出了一种分析发电厂商市场力实施的新方法.

In this paper, the correlativity between transmission capacities limits and suppliers with node price are discussed by an intelligence agent simulation model with node price on pool-based electricity market. The research shows that under market condition suppliers’ pursuing profits behaviors will obviously change line flow and transmission capacities limits can magnify suppliers' market power. Power grid firms gain profits with suppliers’ market power actualizing and the strict measures are needed to break their relation. In this paper, it is also analyzed that the impacts of transmission capacities limits may form intersected market problem by the corresponding shares in congested transmission lines. A new method to analyze suppliers’ market power behaviors is put forward.