委托人与代理人在公司治理中的行为博弈——基于对经营者短期行为的分析

Brand Equity; Customer Mind-set; Product Market; Financial Market Behavioral Game in Corporate Governance between the Principal and the Agent: Based on an Analysis of Operator's Short-run Behavior

现代公司中,经营者(代理人)从事公司的日常经营管理,经营者行为必然影响企业的价值、效率与长远发展。本文从委托人(所有者,董事会)对代理人监督的角度出发,采用博弈论方法对代理人的行为展开分析,从一个侧面证实了“由于所有者与经营者之间近似一次性的博弈,是经营者短期行为的主要原因”这个理论假设。从而得出,解决经营者短期行为问题,可以通过建立一系列的制度或机制,使所有者与经营者保持长期的委托代理关系。

In a modern corporation, the operator(hereafter agent)deals with daily affairs, and his behavior will definitely affect the company's value,efficiency as well as its long-term development. From the eye of the principal's (hereafter owner/ directorate) supervision on the agent, this paper analyzes the agent's behavior with game theory, and has proved the theoretic hypothesis of“the approximate one-off game between the principal and the agent is the main reason of the operator's short-run behavior” laterally. Here we come to a conclusion that in order to resolve the problem of the operator's short-run behavior, we can set up a series of mechanism to make the owner and the operator keep a long-term relation.