互联网骨干网网间互联决策分析

An analysis of policy decision of interconnection between internet backbone providers

文章建立了一个简单的博弈模型来分析两个互联网骨干网运营商(IBP:InternetBackboneProvider)的互联决策,决策是建立在厂商利润最大化基础上的,并且是以成本原则来选择互联方式。文章将此决策原则下的互联决策行为与在竞争原则下的互联决策行为做了比较。结论表明,在互联网发展的初期,IBP采用竞争原则来进行互联决策;在互联网发展到一定阶段,此时大部分用户都连接到互联网上,IBP采用成本原则进行互联决策,两个IBP之间的不同对比关系使其互联的决策倾向也具有差异。

This paper develops a simple theoretical model of game to analyze the policy decision of interconnection between two IBPs (Internet backbone providers). Based on the maximization of profits, they decide whom they want to peer with and who has to pay transit with cost principle. Furthermore, the paper compares IBPs policy decision behavior of interconnection under different decision principles (cost principle and competition principle). The conclusion indicates in the initial stage of development of Internet, IBPs adopt the competition principle to make the policy decision of interconnection, and later in the certain stay of development in Internet, at this moment when most users connect to the Internet, IBPs adopt cost principles to carry on the policy decision of interconnection. Different user structures of two IBPs make their focal points in the decision of interconnection different.