管理层激励与会计行为异化

Management Incentive and Alienation of Accounting Behaviors

有效的企业报酬契约应该既能反映企业的当期业绩,又能与企业的长远发展相关,会计收益与股票价格的相结合便成为广为采用的管理层激励模式。代理人的自利动机、会计程序与方法的可选择性以及会计收益与股票价格的增量相关性,决定代理人可通过操纵会计行为来满足自己的需要。在中国,内生于管理层控制权收益的自利需要具有较大的隐蔽性,使得会计行为异化尤为严重。如何有效缓解由管理动机变异引起的会计行为异化、提高会计信息质量,便成为中国资本市场监管与会计行为优化的重要内容。

The effective enterprise compensation contracts can not only reflect enterprise's current performance,but also correlate with long_term development of enterprises.Combination of accounting income and stock price becomes the common incentive modes adopted by enterprises.Because of the self_motivation of the agent,alternation of accounting procedure and accounting income being increment of stock price,it is determined that agent can meet his own need by manipulating accounting behaviors.In China,the intrinsic need to control rights for managers themselves has deeper disguise,and makes accounting alienation phenomena more serious.How to alleviate the accounting behavior alienation caused by managers' motivation and improve accounting information quality effectively is still an important task for the supervisor in security market.