民营化改革的所有权结构选择

The Choice among Ownership Structures in Privatization

现实中的产权改革是复杂的,存在许多介于纯公有企业与纯民有企业之间的中间形态,文章试图解释这些复杂现象,在不完全合同框架下,扩展了HSV模型,研究了剩余控制权与剩余索取权的不同配置效应,强调了所有权结构安排对管理者行为的约束和激励作用,认为所有权结构选择是社会福利与效率间的权衡问题。另外,文章还简单探讨了合同完全程度和市场竞争对所有权结构选择的影响。

Privatization is a complex issue and the ownership structures of many enterprises are between the purely public owned and the purely private. Under the framework of incomplete contract theory, this article extends the HSV model, studies the different allocation effects between residual rights of control and residual claim rights,and emphasizes the restriction and incentive effects of the choice among ownership structures on the manager. It argues that the choice is a trade off question between social welfare and efficiency. In the end, the article discusses briefly the influences of contract and competition on the choice of ownership structures.