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基于petri网的密码协议安全验证方法

Method Of Verifying Safety On The Base Of Petri Net Cipher Agreement
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摘要 密码协议是任何安全系统的基础,其作用主要是利用密码技术实现网络通信中的密钥分发和身份认证,所以它也是实现计算机网络安全的关键,但是在实践中发现有许多密码协议仍然存在漏洞,因此对密码协议的安全性验证就显得非常重要。本文提出了一种基于Petri网的密码协议形式化描述和安全性验证的方法,该方法建立在倒推状态分析思想与颜色Petri网的可达性矩阵描述的基础之上,并通过实例证明了这种方法的有效性。 Cipher agreement is the base of any safety systems. Its function is achieving cipher key assignment and verifying identity in net communication using cipher technology. It, therefore, is the key achieving safety of computer net. But there are some flaws in the cipher agreement, they are discovered in practices. Safety verifying of cipher agreement, therefore, seems very important. The paper raises a method of verifying safety because of cipher ~agreement form description of Petri net. This method is based on analysis idea of inverse inference state and can-arriving matrix description of color Petri net, and through practice examples proved the method effectiveness.
作者 卢敏
机构地区 贵州工业大学
出处 《贵州水力发电》 2005年第3期83-86,共4页 Guizhou Water Power
关键词 计算机应用 密码协议安全验证 PETRI网 可达性分析 computer application, safety verifying of cipher agreement, Petri net, can-arriving analysis
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