摘要
海德格尔在《技术的追问》一文中构筑了一条“追问”的道路。尽管海德格尔这种追问方式似乎继续贯彻了胡塞尔现象学提问的方向,但从根本上说,海德格尔的研究内容并非是胡塞尔现象学研究纲领的继续和推论。在海德格尔之后,人们对本体论的需要,实际上转变为一种无形的学术运演前提,它成为一种高深莫测的、动态的玄学追问。
H built a road of question in his questions on technology. This approach seems to follow the direction of Husser’s questions on phenomenology, but fundamentally H’s research is not the continuation and conclusion of Husser’s phenomenology. After H, the need for ontology has actually become an invisible precondition of academic exploitation, and thus become profound and dynamic metaphysics question.
出处
《东南大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》
2005年第4期13-21,126,共10页
Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)
基金
"科技伦理与艺术"国家哲学社会科学创新基地项目
东南大学国家课题预研课题"西方马克思主义伦理思想研究"(9213000503)。