企业的倾销行为与提出反倾销诉讼:一个扩展的博弈分析框架

Dumping and Antidumping Lawsuit: An Extended Analysis Framework of Game Theory

我国加入WTO后进出口都有了较大幅度的增长,随之而来的是世界各国针对我国进行的反倾销调查也日益增多,但我国企业对外国企业进行的反倾销诉讼却少有增长。本文使用扩展的博弈论分析框架论证了上述现象,说明随着企业数量的增加,我国企业较易在国外市场进行低价倾销,而面对国外企业的倾销行为却无法采取有效措施;强调了行业协会与国家在进行倾销调查协调时的作用。

Imports and exports increase by a large margin after the accession to the WTO of China, Chinese companies have also suffered increasing anti-dumping investigations. And at the same time, the anti-dumping lawsuits that our enterprises aim at the foreign enterprises grow slowly. This paper has proved these phenomena by use of a patulous game theory analysis framework. The author thinks that with the increase of the number of companies, which have foreign operation rights, those companies incline to sale goods in low price in overseas markets; However, they can not adopt effective measures to against foreign company's dumping behavior. This paper also emphasizes the effect of industry association and the government in the investigation of dumping.