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廉政保证金制度的博弈分析

Analysis of Honest Administration Deposit System with Game Theory
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摘要 为遏制腐败,我国一些地方和单位采用了“廉政保证金制度”。在博弈分析中,国家公职人员和政府为博弈方,分析结果表明:采用廉政保证金制度既能降低个人腐败的概率,又能提高政府监管有力的概率,对遏制腐败具有双重作用;结合我国实际情况,目前的廉政保证金制度对遏制腐败的作用是很小的。 In order to contain corruption, the honest administration deposit system is adopted by some local governments and units. In the analysis of the game system with the civil servants and the government as analysis objects, the result shows that in terms of corruption containment honest administration deposit system can decrease the probability of personal corruption and increase the efficiency of government supervision. Under the specific national conditions of China, the honest administration deposit system plays a less effective role in corruption containment at present.
作者 屈颖 贾志永
出处 《西南交通大学学报(社会科学版)》 2005年第4期115-118,共4页 Journal of Southwest Jiaotong University(Social Sciences)
关键词 廉政保证金制度 腐败 博弈分析 honest administration deposit system corruption game theory
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