摘要
腐败是公务人员违反法定职责与社会其他人串谋瓜分政府经济租金的活动。政府控制经济产生租金,腐败是租金的函数:租金越大,腐败程度越高;公务人员的自由裁量权也加剧腐败的频率和严重程度;但他们的社会责任感则起相反作用;法律纪律的惩处可以抑制但不能消除腐败。腐败与经济快速发展并存的现象为一悖论。经济发展高速期与转型期腐败活动冲击"恶法"而有促进经济效率的倾向。
Corruption is the activity where public servants abandon their duties and disobey the law, and collaborate with others in taking the economic rent out of the state. The corruption function model shows that the state controls the economy and creates economic rent, which is the fundamental source of corruption. The more the rent is, the more the corruption is. And the discretionary powers of public officials increase the frequency and magnitude of corruption, whereas their accountability has the opposite effects. The law and discipline punishment might suppress corruption but could not wipe it out. Corruption could co-exist with the fast growing stages of economic development, which forms a kind of paradox. Corruptions shock those 'evil laws' during the fast-growing and transformation periods, and tend to help improve the economic efficiency.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第6期74-81,共8页
China Soft Science
关键词
腐败
寻租
腐败函数
发展-腐败悖论
恶法
corruption
rent-seeking
corruption function
the paradox of development-corruption
evil laws