股权制度安排、信息不对称与企业非效率投资行为

Equity System, Asymmetric Information and Inefficient Investment Behavior

本文针对股权分置和股权全流通的制度安排,在不同信息状态下研究了企业的投资行为。研究表明,信息对称时,股权全流通制度下企业投资行为达到最优,股权分置制度下国有资产的高折算溢价使得企业存在投资过度行为;信息不对称时,股权分置制度下低质量企业表现出更多投资过度行为,高质量企业表现出更多投资不足行为。证券监管部门近期应该促使股权全流通,远期应该重视规范企业信息披露,从而提高企业投资决策的效率。

This paper studies the investment behavior under different information conditions, with ditlerent institutional arrangements of split stock rights and all-equity circulation. We find that the symmetric information leads optimum investment under all-equity circulation and over-investment under split stock rights due to high discounted premium of state-owned assets, and that asymmetric information leads to over-investment for low quality firms and under-investment for high quality firms. With aim of improving investment efficiency, governmental securities supervision agencies should take actions to promote all-equity circulation in the near future and regulate information disposure in the long run.