略评克里普克、古普塔的“说谎者”悖论——“语境作弄”与“复合命题”解悖方案

Some Comments on Kripke and Gupta's "Liar Paradox"--Unfavorable "Context" and Its "Complex Proposition" Resolution

克里普克举出“间接自涉”例子表明:只有遭受不利的语境“作弄”,语句才沦为“悖论”的;古普塔举出例子表明:克的“根基”说排除过多“好”的语句。可以看出,克、古举出的,均为同类简单例子的复杂化,了无新意;再者,“说谎者”悖论犯“复合命题”谬误,消解这个“千古之谜”之后,便看出克、古(和众多西方权威)的相关理论没有多大价值了。

Kripke gave an (indirect 'self-reference') example to show : our ordinary assertions are liable to exhibit paradoxes , if the 'context' is extremely unfavorable . Gupta gave an example to show : K's 'groundedness' theory eliminates some 'good' assertions . This essay points out : Kripke and Gupta's examples are complications of the (ancient) simple 'name-card' and 'liar' paradoxes . When we point out that these paradoxes commit 'complex proposition' fallacy, we can easily see that K's and G's (and most western authority's ) related theories have not much significance .