经理人激励与公司债务水平的选择

Managerial Incentives and the Choice of Corporate Debt Level

以或有要求权模型研究经理人激励对公司债务水平的影响,研究表明,经理人以股东的激励程度选择公司债务水平与工作努力程度以最大化自己的收益。在一定条件下,当股东所提供的激励较弱时,充分高的债务水平是经理人向外部投资者作出的他将努力工作的可信承诺,是项目得到融资的充分条件;当该激励较强时,经理人所选择的债务水平低于能够最大化公司价值的数值。

This paper analyzes the impact of managerial incentives provided by the shareholders on the corporate debt level with a contingent claims model.The manager chooses the corporate debt level and his efforts in turn to maximize his benefits. Under certain conditions, when the incentives are weak, debt level high enough is the manager’s credible precommitment to his efforts to the outside investors, and the sufficient condition for the investment project to be fully financed. When the incentives are strong, however, the manager will choose a debt level that is below the one which could maximize the firm value.