信息不对称下税收征管的多重博弈分析

A Repeated Game Analysis on Tax Collection and Administration Under Asymmetric Information

根据税收征管过程中的信息不对称现象,将税务机关稽查成功的概率及应税企业偷漏税行为所带来的诚信损失这两个变量引入税收监督博弈模型,进行税收征管的多重博弈分析。分析结果表明,税收征管博弈混合战略纳什均衡不仅与税务稽查成本、罚款倍数、应税企业的偷漏税金额有关,而且与税务机关能否稽查出偷漏税的概率、应税企业偷漏税行为带来的长期额外损失有关。

There is asymmetric information between tax administration and taxpayers in the practice of imposing taxes, which makes it possible for taxpayers to evade taxes. Considering two factors,the probability of successful audit and the reputation loss of tax dodging, this paper analyzes the repeated game equilibrium between tax administration and taxpayers. According to the analysis, the main factors influencing the game equilibrium are not only the cost of tax audit, punishment and the sum of tax dodging but also the probability of successful audit and the reputation loss of tax dodging.