摘要
通过建立连续情形下企业债务期限结构选择的博弈模型,分别分析了利率市场化与利率管制下企业的债务期限结构,指出利率管制从两方面影响民营中小企业融资:(1)信息对称下,对于那些高风险高收益的项目,银行无法在相应的利率水平上进行贷款。(2)信息不对称下,由于利率管制,企业债务期限结构无法作为传递企业质量的信号;此时银行根据企业抵押担保的能力对企业进行贷款,而民营中小企业,可进行抵押的资产不多,使得民营中小企业债务融资渠道不畅。
This paper analyses the debt maturity structure of firm under interest rate liberalization and control by constructing a game theoretic model of debt maturity in continuously. it is suggested that the effect on finance of private medium & small enterprise under interest rate control: (1)Bank can't finance the project of high risk profit with corresponding interest rate under information symmetric. (2)Because interest rate control, the debt maturity wouldn't be signaling of enterprise quality under information asymmetric, and bank finance based on capability of mortgage and guarantee, private medium & small enterprise has too little capital for mortgage to gain adequate fund.
出处
《预测》
CSSCI
2005年第4期57-60,共4页
Forecasting
关键词
信号传递
债务期限
分离均衡
利率管制
<Keyword>signaling
debt maturity
separating equilibrium
interest rate control
