电能质量市场中电磁污染排放权分配的研究

Research on Allocation of Gross Electromagnetic Pollution Emission Right in Power Quality Market

电磁污染最优总量及排放权的最优分配是电磁污染管制的重要内容,属于博弈问题。本文对公共连接点内所有成员之间争取电磁污染排放权和良好电能质量的博弈行为进行了深入分析,确定了用户所能承受最高的排污收费单价和最高电能质量服务收费单价,并采用统一密封拍卖博弈模型使博弈参与者将他们能够承受的电磁污染排放权和电能质量服务的最高单价作为他们的投标价格;使电能质量监管部门确定的电磁污染排污总量将满足“利润最大化”条件,可以实现社会效益的最大化;并确定了排放权在市场参与者间满足“帕雷托最优”分配条件的贝叶斯Nash均衡点,该均衡点可以实现电磁资源和社会资源的优化分配。算例表明,本文所提出的电磁污染排放权总量的确定及分配方法是可行而有效的。

Research on optimal gross and distribution of emission right (ER) is an important content of electromagnetic pollution control, and it should be worked out based on game theory. This paper analyses game strategy sets of all players in one point of common connection (PCC) for ER and high power quality (PQ), and proposes the highest acceptable prices of ER and PQ service for gamers. This paper adopts uniform price sealed auction to make all bidders take the highest acceptable prices as their bid-prices, so the ER gross worked out by PQ Supervision Department can satisfy 'Maximizing Profit' demand. This gross can maximize social integrative profit. This auction mode also proposes the Bayes Nash equilibrium for ER distribution among all gamers satisfying 'Pareto Optimality'. This equilibrium can optimize distribution of social investment and electromagnetic capability. Examples indicate that the proposed method for optimal gross and distribution of ER based on game theory is feasible and effective.