社会偏好与制度权衡:美国金融管制对其公司治理结构的影响

制度决定了经济绩效,这是制度经济学的基本逻辑;但是什么决定了制度选择?以及不同制度之间是否存在严格的“优劣”判断?本文从美国的金融发展史出发,论证了社会偏好对金融管制制度的权衡影响,由此推断管制对公司治理的影响。本文认为,在社会偏好上,美国出于对市场权力过分集中(垄断)的反感,决定了政府多年来的金融管制措施,由此形成了特定的管制制度;而这一制度分散化了金融中介机构及其投资组合,阻止它们拥有能对工商企业产生足够控制权的股份,同时,银行被禁止跨州经营,保险公司被禁止拥有股票,共同基金、养老基金也被分散化了。这样,对于大型上市公司而言,由于股权高度分散,弱化了所有权约束,造成了“强管理者,弱所有者”的公司治理结构。在上述逻辑结构下,整个金融市场制度和公司治理就显得可以理解了。

American economy has been famous for its less control. However, due to the important role of finance in the national economy, American is one of the countries with the severest financial supervision in the world. To control the market power over concentration, the American government adopts strict measures of financial regulation over past years. Financial intermediations and their portfolios are broken up, so adequate stocks, which can afford them the power to control the industrial and commercial firms, cannot be acquired. Trans-state operation is forbidden for banks. Holding stocks is forbidden for insurance agents. Furthermore, mutual fund and pension fund are also dispersed. For large listed company, the high dispersed stock leads to the weaken ownership control, and results in the occurrence of corporate governance structure called'the strong controller and weak owner'.