非对称互联网骨干网网间互联激励分析

Incentive Analysis of Asymmetric Internet Network Interconnection

为了促进互联网的发展和制定出合理的互联政策,分析了非对称互联网骨干网对互联互通的偏好。骨干网网间互联互通质量的好坏决定着互联网业务的质量,而解决互联互通质量的关键在于正确了解不同企业对互联的评价。互联网与电信网最大的不同是其主要通信为网站与人的通信,从而内容提供商的多少能够代表骨干网企业的不同程度。针对互联网的特点,采用两阶段博弈模型分析对拥有不同内容提供商基数的骨干网企业的互联激励。通过对互联互通质量差异效应和需求扩大效应分析,可以看出,不同互联网骨干网企业具有不同的互联偏好,基数小的网络偏好完全互联,而基数大的互联网骨干网企业随着两网基数差异不同而对互联有不同的偏好。最后利用模型得出的结论对我国骨干网企业互联现象进行了说明。

The interconnection preference of asymmetric IBPs (Internet Backbone Providers) was studied to promote internet development and make reasonable interconnection policy. Interconnection quality determined the quality of Internet services and the key to solve interconnection difficulty grasped interconnection valuation of the providers. Since the difference between internet and telecom was that the former is the main communication between websites and person, the amount of ICP may represent difference between IBPs to a great extent. Based on the characteristics of Internet, the two-stage game model analyzed the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to the size of their installed bases of ICPs (Internet Content Providers).Through the analysis of quality differentiation effect and demand expansion effect of interconnection, the smaller provider prefers perfect interconnection quality, while the provider has the different preferences of interconnection quality according to the difference between installed bases. Finally, theory derived from the model analyzes interconnection phenomena between IBPs in China.