摘要
本文基于公司并购动机理论,揭示了我国控股股东行为的深层次原因,指出了市场制度缺陷较大和法律对投资者保护较弱,获取控制权私人收益的单位成本越低,控制权私人收益发生率越高,结果导致追求企业价值最大化的并购行为被扭曲,低效率的并购频繁发生。提出规范和制衡控股股东行为应从市场制度缺陷入手,从相应的法律制度规则设立入手。
In the countries of having greater shortcoming of market system and having weaker investor protection, the unit cost of acquiring control benefits is reduced and the occuring rate of control benefits raised. It eventually caused that takeover behavior of pursuing value maximum was twisted and ineffective takeover frequently taked place.Therefore ,standardizing and balancing controlling stakeholders behavior should start with the shortcoming of market system and establishment of corresponding legal system.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2005年第7期65-68,共4页
East China Economic Management
关键词
控制权转移
控股股东
控制权收益
并购
<Keyword>control transfer
controlling shareholder
control benefits
takeover
