摘要
讨论了当从方目标函数中含有主方未知参数时的诱导策略的灵敏度，提出了不变区间和满意区间的概念，研究了此类不完全信息主从对策的激励相容机制和强激励相容机制，并探讨了多步主从对策的情形．
The sensitivity of the induction strategy when there are unknown parameters of themaster side in the objective function of the slave side is investigated.The concepts of the in-variant interval and satisfied interval are proposed.The induced compatible mechanism andthe strong induced compatible mechanism of such Stackelberg(master/slave)game with in-complete information are studied.The case of multi-step Stackelberg game is also discussed.
出处
《华中理工大学学报》
CSCD
北大核心
1995年第5期15-19,共5页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金
关键词
主从对策
诱导策略
激励相容机制
对策
Stackelberg game
induction strategy
induced compatible mechanism
sensi-tivity analysis
incomplete information
