上市公司违法违规处罚和投资者利益保护效果被引量：59

Listed Companies Fraud Punishment and Investor Protection

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摘要文章从理论和实证两个角度讨论了证券执法对外部投资者保护的效果.从理论上讲,加大处罚力度可以对上市公司内部人起到威慑作用,达到保护中小投资者利益的目的.但是,我们对2001～2003年间受到处罚公司A股收益率的事件分析表明,在处罚公告日前后投资者遭受了非正常损失.对这一结果的可能解释,一是证券执法尚未对潜在违法违规者起到真正的威慑作用;二是我国现行证券法规中缺乏民事责任的规定,受害的投资者得不到充分补偿.因此,加大证券违法处罚力度、明确证券违法的民事责任应该成为证券法修改的重要内容. In this paper, we discuss the issue of securities law enforcement and investor protection. Theoretically, strengthening the law enforcement will restrict the action of potential law-breakers and protect the small investors. However, after the event study of the punishment of the listed companies during 2001--2003 in China, we find that near the announcement day, the A shareholders get negative abnormal returns. Therefore, we present a modification to the securities law in China.

作者陈国进赵向琴林辉

机构地区厦门大学金融系厦门大学党委党校

出处《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第8期48-58,共11页 Journal of Finance and Economics

基金国家社科基金(04BJC026) 福建省社科"十五"规划课题(2003E003)

关键词上市公司违规违法处罚投资者利益保护 listed companies fraud punishment investor protection

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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