企业激励机制与经理股票期权——上海贝岭股票期权计划的案例研究

Stimulating Mechanism for Enterprises and Executive Stock Option

在现代企业中,所有权和控制权的分离,要求将重要的决策权委托与管理者,这导致管理者有可能以牺牲股东的利益为代价,而做出对其有利的决策。现代公司治理需要解决的两个基本问题:一是经理选择,二是经理激励。激励问题是企业理论的核心之一。本文将从经理阶层和股东之间的关系入手,分析经理阶层及股东之间利益冲突的类型,进而通过对上海贝岭股票期权计划的案例剖析,探讨了股票期权在中国企业运作实施的现实可行性及局限性,并对未来前景做进一步的预见。

In modern enterprises, the separation of ownership and management may lead to conflicts between management and shareholders. When making decisions, management may sacrifice shareholders＇ benefit to their own interests. This paper describes the agency relationship between management and shareholders and discusses the so-called agency problem caused by conflicts between management and shareholders. The term of Executive Stock Option, a stimulating mechanism then is introduced to deal with balance problem of income and risk. Further more, the paper focuses on the case study for Shanghai Belling stock option planning and probes into the feasibility and the limitation of the application of stock option in enterprises.