摘要
文章拟从逆向选择和道德风险两个角度对我国中小企业融资困境形成的内在根本原因做出深入分析。并在此基础上,利用质量信号博弈模型和声誉理论的分析方法,提出了解决信贷配给的思路和建议。
From the views of adverse selection and moral hazard, the thesis deeply analyzes the internal basic reasons of financing dilemma for mini-mid enterprises. And on this basis, it puts forward the thinking and suggesting of resolving credit rationing by means of quality signal game model and reputation theory.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2005年第8期138-140,共3页
East China Economic Management
关键词
信息不对称
逆向选择
道德风险
信贷配给
asymmetry information
adverse selection
moral hazard
credit rationing
