企业社会资本的自愿供给:一个静态博弈模型

The Voluntary Supply of Corporate Social Capital: A Static Game Model

本文在相关文献的基础上,重新界定了社会资本的内涵,并采用完全信息静态博弈模型研究了企业网络中社会资本的自愿供给问题。模型分析表明,在企业社会资本的供给决策过程中,纳什均衡解是可以达到的,但它小于帕累托最优解。论文还指出,企业的规模是影响企业社会资本均衡供给水平的重要因素之一。

Based on the review of relevant literatures, this paper redefines the concept of social capital, and the issue of the voluntary supply of social capital in the corporate network is studied in a complete informational static game model. Results show that Nash Equilibrium solution can be got during the process of the supply decision-making of corporate social capital, and is smaller than the Pareto optimal solution. The research indicates that the scale of firm is one of the important factors influencing the equilibrium supply level of corporate social capital.