国有企业债务重组方式选择的博弈分析

Analysis Based on Game Theory of Swap of Debt Reconstruction in State-owned Enterprises

资产管理公司与债务重组企业之间的信息不对称可能导致道德风险,如何选择债务重组工具来更好地解决这个问题。建立无限期重复博弈模型,分析债权、普通股、可转债和可转换优先股等债务重组工具中何种工具对资产管理公司而言最优。通过对模型的数量分析发现,如果好的产出水平大于债务重组金额2倍,选择可转债或可转换优先股都是最优的债务重组工具;反之,以债权形式对国有企业债务重组为最优的重组方式。

There exists information asymmetry between AMC and state-owned enterprises which can cause the problem of moral hazard. To deal with this problem, it is necessary to choose a proper debt reconstruction tool and compensation policy. A game model is set up, which helps to study which tool is the best one among debt, common stock, convertible preferred stock and convertible debt. The analysis shows that convertible preferred stock or convertible debt is the best if good output level is twice as high as the original eapital. Otherwise, the form of debt will be better.