不完全信息下的封闭投标机制研究

A STUDY ON SEALED-BID MECHANISM WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

本文在相互依存的两点分布假设下研究了一种常用的协商机制－－封闭投标机制，把它构造成一个不完全信息的非合作对策模型。在此基础上，给出了Ｂａｙｅｓｉａｎ－Ｎａｓｈ平衡点的完全刻划，按其实现的效率把平衡点集分类，深入地研究了它们的存在性、效率及相互关系。最后，研究了先验信念分布的变化对平衡点集的影响，证明Ｂａｙｅｓｉａｎ－Ｎａｓｈ平衡点集对整个先验分布类具有上半连续性，仅对于一个较小的先验分布类具有下半连续性。

In this paper,we study sealed-bid mechanism with two-type value structure,which is modelled as a kind of nonccoperative games with incomplete in-formation. Based on the model,the sets of Bayesian equilibrium are characterized,their existence, efficiency and relation are analysed,and the effect of change of trad-er′s beliefs to the sets of Bayesian equilibrium is discussed.