水电工程保险市场参与主体行为研究

Study on Behavior of Participation Subjects in Hydropower Engineering Insurance Market

针对水电工程保险市场参与主体行为影响水电工程保险市场健康发展,利用信息经济学分析了我国水电工程保险市场的信息不对称现象,建立了投保人与保险人的不完全信息静态博弈模型,提出促进工程保险在我国水电工程中应用的对策,以减少工程保险应用所带来的道德风险问题。

Behavior of participation subjects plays an important role in the healthy development of hydropower engineering insurance market.Therefore,information asymmetry in hydropower engineering insurance market is analyzed by using the method of information economics.And then it establishes incomplete information static game model between policy holder and insurer.Furthermore,it puts forward various countermeasures on the grounds that it can promote the spread of engineering insurance in hydropower projects and reduce the moral hazard problem caused by its application.