摘要
新农合提供给农民的是一种混同契约,该契约在合作医疗基金精算平衡下的激励可行性必要条件是农民的预期健康损失处于(δhL,δhH)区间。在自愿参与的原则下,处于该区间之外的农民不会完全自愿地选择参合。因此,只要新农合制度遵循自愿参与原则,且不存在隐性强制,新农合制度实现全覆盖目标就存在着契约类型的制约。
The contract provided by the new rural cooperative medical scheme is a pooling contract.This paper concludes a necessary condition such that the pooling contract is incentive feasible.This condition is that the farmer s anticipated heath loss interval is δhL≤δh≤δhH,which means those farmers out of the interval will not choose to purchase the contract under the principle of voluntary participation.So the New RCMS with positive financial contribution rate & reimbursement rate and without implicit compelling m...
出处
《安徽农业科学》
CAS
北大核心
2010年第36期20997-20998,21002,共3页
Journal of Anhui Agricultural Sciences
基金
中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20090461079)
江苏省高校哲学社会科学基金项目(09SJB630030)
金陵科技学院科研项目(JIT-N-2008002)