摘要
文章考察了在电信业"全业务竞争"的背景下,规制机构采取限制强势厂商实施捆绑策略这种非对称规制措施的效果。结果发现,当宽带(固话)市场为垄断结构时,不仅能够扶持弱势厂商,而且消费者剩余与社会福利都增加;当宽带(固话)市场为双寡头竞争时,虽然能够扶持弱势厂商,并且提高社会福利,但是消费者剩余下降,并且在短期内,弱势厂商在移动通信市场的份额甚至会下降。
Under the background of full-service competition in telecommunications, the paper studies the effects of asymmetric regulation that regulators ban stronger firm from commodity bundling.The result shows that, if broadband market (fixed line) is monopolistic,the certain regulatory policy not only is in favor of weaker firm,but also augments consumer surplus and social welfare.And if broadband market (fixed line) is duopolistic,the certain regulatory policy is in favor of weaker firm and augments social welfar...
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第7期28-38,共11页
Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词
全业务竞争
产品间捆绑
非对称规制
电信业
full-service competition
commodity bundling
asymmetric regulation
telecommunications