显性部分存款保险下的有效银行退出机制——基于成本收益分析下的博弈分析

Banking market exit mechanism research based on the partial explicit deposit insurance

目前,中国银行业还没有建立起有效的市场退出机制和相关的制度安排,这不符合市场经济条件下金融业的基本规则,也给国家带来了沉重的负担。本论文通过一个二阶段完全信息动态博弈模型的分析揭示,由于银监会未建立起有效的成本约束下的市场退出机制,使得相机抉择的关闭机制对于商业银行而言是一个不可置信的威胁,促进了商业银行的冒险投资,加之隐性存款保险的存在,形成巨大的社会成本和福利损失。目前条件下,加快市场退出机制建设并建立与之相配套的显性部分存款保险制度是一个上佳的选择。

Now, market exit mechanism and correlative system arrangement have not been established in China banking sector, it does not accord with basic financial rules of market economy, and brings heavy burden to the nation. In this paper, we build a three phases complete information dynamic game model, pointing out that conditional closure mechanism is incredible to commercial bank due to lack of effective market exit mechanism of CBRC under cost restriction, moreover, it makes commercial bank more like risk investment, meanwhile, it leads to huge social cost and welfare loss under implicit deposit insurance. Under current circumstance, accelerating establishment of market exit mechanism and adaptive partial explicit deposit insurance system is a advisable choice.